The African Union-ICC Controversy Before the ICJ: A Way Forward to Strengthen International Criminal Justice? by Bachmann, Sascha-Dominick Dov & Sowatey-Adjei, Naa A.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 29 Number 2 
4-7-2020 
The African Union-ICC Controversy Before the ICJ: A Way Forward 
to Strengthen International Criminal Justice? 
Sascha-Dominick Dov Bachmann 
Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sascha-Dominick D. Bachmann & Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei, The African Union-ICC Controversy Before the 
ICJ: A Way Forward to Strengthen International Criminal Justice?, 29 Wash. L. Rev. 247 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol29/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of 
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2020 Washington International Law Journal Association 
 
   
 
THE AFRICAN UNION-ICC CONTROVERSY BEFORE 
THE ICJ: A WAY FORWARD TO STRENGTHEN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE?  
Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann & Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei† 
Abstract:  The International Criminal Court was set up as a court of last resort to 
prosecute the most serious crimes under international law when its member states are either 
unable or unwilling to act. The African Union initially welcomed the court due to the 
continent’s history of violence and war. However, their soured when the ICC began 
indicting African heads of state and government officials. Since then, there has been a 
constant “battle” over whether such defendants could invoke immunity under customary 
international law. General criticism of the ICC by the African Union and other observers 
for its lack of focus has turned into region-specific criticism of the court as a “Western 
tool,” singling out and targeting African leaders. Consequently, African states have started 
to refuse to cooperate with the Court. At an AU Summit in January 2018, a resolution was 
adopted to seek an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the issue 
of immunity in respect to the ICC. This article will elaborate on the often-strained AU-ICC 
relationship prior to the 2018 AU Summit before examing three scenarios highlighting how 
an ICJ decision would affect the present AU-ICC relationship. The article concludes with 
recommendations and the observation that a compromise must be sought to end the current 
standoff and impasse. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”)1 was established as a court 
of last resort for the prosecution of serious international crimes, including 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, nearly two 
decades after its establishment, the Court faces many setbacks; one of its key 
challenges being its near exclusive focus on Africa and its leaders.2 This 
controversy with the African Union (“AU”) has been going on for nearly a 
decade and it never grows boring.3 It has been a challenge to keep track of all 
instances in which the African Union has objected to the ICC’s perceived 
interference and intrusions in the internal affairs of African countries, 
particularly their domestic criminal justice systems.4 During its 2018 ordinary 
summit in Addis Ababa, the AU-ICC controversy took a new turn, with the 
African Union opting for a more constructive, de-escalatory engagement 
using processes of international law and comity.5 The African Union declared 
that it would seek through the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(“UNGA”) an Advisory Opinion (“AO”) of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”)6 on the question of immunity of African heads of state and 
governments as a bar to criminal prosecution before the ICC.7 The AU also 
sought an interpretative declaration from the ICC’s management oversight and 
legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), on the statutory 
relationship between Article 27 of the Rome Statute,8 which removed 
 
 
1  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
2  Tim Murithi, Africa Relations with the ICC: A Need for Reorientation?, in PERSPECTIVES – POL. 
ANALYSIS & COMMENT. FROM AFR., Aug. 6, 2012, at 4.  
3  Theresa Reinold, African Union v International Criminal Court: Episode MLXIII(?), EJIL TALK 
BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/african-union-v-international-
criminal-court-episode-mlxiii/; see also PHILOMENA APIKO & FATEN AGGAD, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR DEV. 
POL’Y MGMT., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN UNION: WHAT WAY 
FORWARD? 1 (2016). 
4  Murithi, supra note 2, at 4–6.  
5  APIKO & AGGAD, supra note 3, at 1.  
6  See Priya Pillai, The African Union, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court 
of Justice: At the Fault Lines of International Accountability, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/10/african-union-international-criminal-court-and-
international-court. 
7  African Union [AU], Decisions, Declarations and Resolution, 30th Ordinary Sess. of the Afr. U 
Assembly, at 2 (Jan. 28–9, 2018). 
8  Id.  
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immunity of state officials accused of core crimes, and Article 98,9 which 
addresses cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity of state officials 
and consent to surrender state officials. The African Union also sought 
clarification on how United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) referrals 
affect the immunity of officials of states that are non-signatories to the Rome 
Statute.10 This latest move by the African Union may resemble a historic 
transition from hitherto politics of hostility to deescalation in its relations to 
the Court by resorting to the use of international law11 as a form of proactive 
“lawfare.” Lawfare in general refers to the use and the abuse of the rule of law 
to achieve political goals as part of a wider strategic approach towards an 
adversary; it is often used within the remit of non-contact warfare but can also 
be used as a method of its own.12  
Before 2018, earlier African Union responses to the ICC have always 
centered around the political allegation that the ICC was selectively and 
exclusively “prosecuting Africans.”13 The African Union even labelled the 
ICC a “neo-colonial court,”14 which seemed to be only interested in 
prosecuting Africans opposing Western influence and hence was using Africa 
as a “test laboratory” for international criminal justice.15 Consequently, in 
2017, the African Union passed a resolution calling on all African States to 
 
 
9  Id. at 1.  
10  Id. 
11  Reinold, supra note 3. 
12  Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann, Andrew Dowse, & Hakan Gunneriusson, Competition Short of 
War – How Russia’s Hybrid and Grey-Zone Warfare are a Blueprint for China’s Global Power Ambitions, 
1 AUSTL. J. DEF. & STRATEGIC STUD. 41, 50 (2019). For a more detailed overview of the notion of “Lawfare,” 
see Andres B. Munoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov Bachmann, Lawfare in Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century 
Warfare, 7 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 63, 63–87 (2016).  
13  Sascha Dominik Dov Bachmann & Luke Nwibo Eda, Pull and Push–Implementing the 
Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute of the ICC within the AU: Opportunities and Challenges, 43 
BROOKLYN J. INT’L LAW 457, 465 (2018); see also Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, The Crisis of International 
Criminal Law in Africa: A Regional Regime in Response? 66 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 287, 287–311 (2019).  
14  Omorogbe, supra note 13, at 287–311; Reinold, supra note 3. 
15  Africa as a test case in general. See Max Du Plessis & Chris Gevers, Kenyan ICC Cases a Good 
Test of an ICC Founding Principle, EJIL TALK BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. (Feb. 8, 2011), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/kenyan-case-a-good-test-of-an-icc-founding-principle/. For the overall focus on 
Africa, see Bachmann & Eda, supra note 13, at 524; for Africa as a “laboratory,” see Fabrice Tambe Endoh 
& ML Melvin Mbao, Political Dynamics in Kenya’s Post-Electoral Violence: Justice Without Peace or 
Political Compromise?, 25 AFR. SEC. REV, 275, 280 (2016).  
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stop cooperating with the ICC in respect to executing warrants for the arrest 
of African suspects16 and to withdraw en masse from the ICC.17 South Africa 
was one of the first countries to respond to this call for mass withdrawal when 
it attempted to leave the ICC in 2017 under the Zuma government. This move, 
however, was later blocked by the South African Constitutional Court.18 
The consequences of state withdrawals have been discussed in the 
relevant literature on international criminal justice.19 The AU argued that the 
ICC’s interference in the internal affairs of Africa was scuttling the peace and 
reconciliatory efforts in Darfur and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.20 
Consequent to its opposition to the ICC, the African Union took the initial step 
to establish a regional criminal court for Africa by adding jurisdictional 
powers to the existing African Court of Justice and Human Rights, through 
the inclusion of core crimes to its jurisdiction. Such a new hybrid court—part 
human rights appeal court and part criminal court—has the potential to reduce 
the impact of the ICC on Africa.21 The Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the 
“Malabo Protocol”)22 grants immunity from criminal prosecution to African 
heads of state—meaning that African leaders accused of core crimes will not 
 
 
16  Benedict Chigara & Chidebe Nwankwo, “To be or not to be?” The African Union and its Member 
States Parties’ Participation as High Contracting States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (1998), 33 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 243, 243 (2015).  
17  African Union [AU], Decisions, Declarations and Resolution and Motion, 28th Ordinary Sess. of 
the Afr. U. Assembly, at 2 (Jan. 30–31, 2017); see also African Union Backs Mass Withdrawal From ICC, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38826073; Gwenyth Gamble Jarvi, 
African Union Leaders Back Leaving ICC, JURIST (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.jurist.org/news/2017/02/african-union-leaders-back-leaving-icc/. 
18  See South Africa's Decision to Leave ICC Ruled “Invalid,” BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39050408. 
19  Dapo Akande, South African Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court – Does the ICC 
Statute Lead to Violations of Other International Obligations?, EJIL TALK BLOG OF THE EURO. J. INT’L L. 
(Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/south-african-withdrawal-from-the-international-criminal-court/.  
20  Id.; Bachmann & Eda, supra note 13, at 465 (with further  
sources). 
21  Max Du Plessis, Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction Over 
International Crimes, 235 INST. SECURITY STUD. 1, 8 (2012).  
22  See generally AU, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol of the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, June 27, 2014, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36398-treaty-0045_-
_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_
rights_e.pdf [hereinafter Malabo Protocol]. 
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be prosecuted before the proposed new African criminal court while they are 
still serving in their official capacities.23 Article 46A bis of the Malabo 
Protocol provides that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before 
the court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody 
acting or entitled to act in such a capacity, or other senior state officials based 
on their functions, during their tenure in office.”24 The general potential for 
international criminal justice and also the limitations of such a future Pan-
African Criminal Court have been discussed in literature25 and will be further 
scrutinized in this article. Prior to adoption of the Malabo Protocol, the 
disagreements between the African Union and ICC had reached new heights 
when the African Union accused European states of abusing universal 
jurisdiction by issuing arrest warrants against Africans in a bid to strengthen 
the hands of the ICC.26 Then, the watershed moment came when the ICC 
issued arrest warrants against some African heads of state who were accused 
of crimes against humanity.27 The African Union responded by accusing the 
ICC of violating the customary law principle of Heads of State Immunity 
regarding African leaders.28 
Two high profile cases demonstrate this current impasse between the 
AU and the Court. The first is the case of now ousted Sudanese President 
Omar Al-Bashir,29 and the second is the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
case.30 The ICC recently confirmed that South Africa was legally required to 
 
 
23  Id.; Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications, Snapshots, AMNESTY INT’L 1, 4 (2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR0161372017ENGLISH.PDF. 
24  Malabo Protocol art. 46A bis, supra note 22. 
25  Eden Matiyas, What Prospects For An African Court Under The Malabo Protocol?, 
JUSTICEINFO.NET (May 31, 2018), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/other/37633-what-prospects-for-an-
african-court-under-the-malabo-protocol.html.  
26  Id.  
27  Id. 
28  Id.; Murithi, supra note 2, at 6. 
29  Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for violating 
Art. 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, 1, 98 (July 14, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02856.PDF.  
30  See Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Case Information Sheet, (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/kenyattaEng.pdf; see also ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta 
charges for Kenya ethnic violence, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
30347019. 
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arrest Al-Bashir, but it declined to refer South Africa to the UNSC.31 
Consequently, on May 8, 2019, the ICC also found that Jordan, as an Arab 
League state, breached its treaty obligation under the Rome Statute by failing 
to arrest Al-Bashir when he attended an Arab League summit in Amman.32  
By and large, the new development in the AU-ICC controversy (without 
commenting on the possible outcome/decision of the ICJ on African Union’s 
request) will have serious implications for international criminal justice.33 
Legal commentators argue that the ICC’s decisions on the questions of 
immunity of state officials have been inconsistent,34 and even legally flawed35 
(four different, mutually exclusive rationales on immunity), prompting fears 
that if the ICJ was to make a finding that contradicts the ICC’s position, ICJ 
and ICC may well be on the road to conflicting jurisprudence.36 In addition, it 
is also unclear what the reaction of the African Union would be if the ICJ 
found in favor of the ICC or vice versa if the ICJ would rule find in favor of 
the African Union. Finally, many consider the African Union’s step as capable 
of causing a stand-off between the ICC and ICJ despite any future AO of the 
ICJ being non-binding in nature.37 
 
 
31  See Windell Nortje, South Africa’s Refusal to Arrest Omar Al-Bashir, 85 TOAEP POLICY BRIEF 
SERIES 1 (2017), http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/85-nortje/; see also ICC Panel Confirms: South Africa 
Legally Required to Arrest Al-Bashir, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT (July 6, 2017), 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20170706/icc-panel-confirms-south-africa-legally-required-arrest-
albashir. 
32  ICC Reverses Jordan Non-Cooperation Referral for Failure to Arrest Al-Bashir, INT’L CRIM. J. 
RESOURCE CENTRE (May 10, 2019), https://ijrcenter.org/2019/05/10/icc-reverses-jordan-non-cooperation-
referral-for-failure-to-arrest-al-bashir/; see also ICC: Jordan Was Required to Arrest Sudan’s Bashir, HUM. 
RTS WATCH (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/06/icc-jordan-was-required-arrest-sudans-
bashir. 
33  Nabil M. Orina, Should the ICJ Render an Advisory Opinion on the Immunity Question re Articles 
27 & 98 of the Rome Statute?, INT. CRIM. JUST. AFRICA (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.icjafrica.com/single-
post/2018/03/24/Should-the-ICJ-render-an-advisory-opinion-on-the-immunity-question-re-Articles-27-98-
of-the-Rome-Statute. 
34  Id. 
35  See Patryk I. Labuda’s “Response” to Reinold’s Article “African Union v International Criminal 
Court: Episode MLXIII(?),” EJIL TALK BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (March 23, 2018 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/african-union-v-international-criminal-court-episode-mlxiii/. 
36  Reinold, supra note 3. 
37  Orina, supra note 33.  
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In light of these pressing issues, this article seeks to understand and 
discuss the implications of this new development in the AU-ICC controversy 
for the future of international criminal justice. In particular, the impact or 
effects it would have on the complementarity jurisdiction and relationship of 
the ICC with national legal and judicial authorities. The article will reflect on 
the AU-ICC relationship in light of the complementarity provision under 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. To that effect it will explore the 
relationship between Articles 27 and 98 of the Statute which form the 
cornerstone of the African Union’s proposed submission to the ICJ. This leads 
then to the question of how the current AU-ICC standoff could be resolved in 
light of the potential outcome of a future ICJ ruling. Using three scenarios of 
a hypothetical decision by the ICJ, we look into the likely nature and possible 
new dimension in the AU-ICC relationship that is likely to develop from the 
outcome of the awaited decision of the ICJ on African Union’s request. It will 
specifically consider what would be the likely reaction and new approach of 
the African Union to the ICC’s policies on prosecution should the ICJ find 
against the African Union. It will also consider whether an ICJ decision 
finding in favour of the African Union could repair the already battered AU-
ICC relationship. In its third part, the article will consider the potential 
implications of a future ICJ decision on the future of international criminal 
justice, in particular, the complementarity jurisdiction of the ICC. It will also 
consider the potential stand-off that the ICJ decision could cause between the 
World Court and the ICC and what impact it would have on the consistency 
and predictability of the international criminal justice system. The final part 
then looks at the potential effects of such an ICJ AO and their implications for 
the future of international criminal justice. The article concludes with some 
recommendations and the observation that a compromise has to be sought to 
end the current standoff and impasse.  
II. THE AU-ICC RELATIONSHIP BEFORE THE 2018 AU DECISION TO SEEK 
AN ICJ ADVISORY OPINION 
“In July 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court came into force, giving birth to the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’ or ‘the Court’). This marked a significant moment 
in international criminal justice. The birth of a permanent court 
that would hold accountable those responsible for gross 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
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was now a reality. The African region played a great and active 
role in the realisation of this Court.”38 
The role of African states in the establishment of the ICC in 1988 is 
more than often forgotten.39 History has it that African states were very 
instrumental in pushing for the realization of the ICC.40 This reflects the fact 
that currently out of the one hundred-and-twenty-four member states of the 
Court, thirty-three are African, which also represents the largest regional 
membership.41 During the period when the Rome Statute—which established 
the Court—was adopted, the Organization of African Unity (now African 
Union) was reeling from the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide and the 
Arusha peace process in Burundi. These two crucial cases sought to persuade 
the African leaders of the essence of complementary justice related to both 
national and international bodies as an avenue of strengthening African 
jurisprudence.42 
A.  Africa’s Contribution to the ICC 
African states were extensively involved in the preparations that 
preceded the diplomatic conference in Rome, where the Rome Statute of the 
ICC was finalized.43 During the preparations, numerous activities that were 
related to the formation of the ICC were organized around the African 
continent. Other regional blocks later emulated this approach.44 These 
activities sought to promote support for the draft text of the Statute, and also 
offer more explanation to the various issues raised in the draft. It is estimated 
that around ninety organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) 
 
 
38  Rowland J V Cole, Africa's Relationship with The International Criminal Court: More Political Than 
Legal, 14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 670, 670 (2013).  
39  Paul Nantulya, What’s Next for Africa and the International Criminal Court, AFR. CENTER (Dec. 
17, 2017), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/whats-next-africa-international-criminal-court-icc/.  
40  Daniel D Ntanda Nsereko, Triggering the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 4 AFR. 
HUM. RTS. L. J. 256, 257 (2004); see also Hassan Jallow & Fatou Bensouda, International Criminal Law in 
an African Context, in AFRICAN GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41 (Max du Plessis ed., 2008).  
41  Nantulya, supra note 39. 
42  Id. 
43  Phakiso Mochochoko, Africa and the International Criminal Court, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 243 (Evelyn A. Ankumah & Edward K. Kawaka eds., 2005).  
44  Id. at 247–48 
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based in Kenya, South Africa, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Uganda were 
part of the coalition that lobbied in their various countries for the immediate 
establishment of an International Criminal Court.45 The call for the 
establishment of the ICC came from the highest levels of leadership on the 
African continent.46 Key among them was the Southern African Development 
Community (“SADC”), which was very vocal in its support for the ICC.47 
Fourteen member states of the SADC met in September 1997 and set out ten 
basic principles which they wanted to be included in the statute of the ICC.48 
Later on, a follow up meeting was held in Senegal in February 1998 with 
representatives of twenty-five African states attending this meeting. At this 
meeting, which produced a resolution generally referred to as the “Dakar 
Declaration,” there was a unanimous call for the establishment of an effective 
and independent international criminal court, which was approved by all.49 
It is worth noting that the support of Africa for the ICC did not end with 
these declarations. The African block was also instrumental in crafting the 
Rome Statute. Countries like Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal, South Africa, and 
Tanzania were involved in the discussions related to the establishment of the 
Court at a presentation of a draft statute organized by the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) to the UNGA in 1993.50 
African support was further enhanced by the impressive show of 
support during the Rome Conference in July 1998, where 47 African countries 
were present during the drafting of the Rome Statute and a majority of them 
 
 
45  Id. at 248. 
46  Cole, supra note 38, at 673.  
47  Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court and Its Work in Africa: Confronting the Myths, 
173 ISS PAPER 4, 4 (2008).  
48  Khiphusizi Josiah Jele, The Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, Speech 
delivered at the Sixth Committee of the 52nd General Assembly (Oct. 21, 1997). 
49  Abdou Diouf, Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, 
¶ 4 (Feb. 2, 1988) http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DakarDeclarationFeb98Eng.pdf; African Commission 
on Hum. and Peoples’ Rights, Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, ¶ 1 (April 1999). 
50  COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009); 
see also INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS 
FOURTH SESSION, 25-6 Doc. A/49/10, (July 22, 1994), http://legal.un.org/ilc/ (accessed July 20, 2019) 
[hereinafter Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court]. 
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voted in favor of adoption at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.51 
After the Statute was open for adoption, Senegal became the first state 
party to ratify the Rome Statute on February 2, 1999, and several African 
countries followed suit thereafter.52 Côte d’Ivoire in February 2005, when it 
was not even a party to the Rome Statute, made a declaration that accepted 
the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to crimes committed on its territory since 
September 19, 2002.53 In December 2010, Alassane Ouattara, who was then 
involved in a leadership tussle with incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo, 
wrote to the ICC in his capacity as the recognized elected President of Côte 
d’Ivoire reaffirming the earlier declaration and his state’s full cooperation with 
the Court.54 This showed how much the African Union and its member states 
appreciated the establishment of the ICC.  
Civil Society groups in Africa were also not left behind in this historic 
movement. They were very instrumental in building the momentum which led 
to the establishment of the ICC.55 The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”) was one of those groups that was instrumental in 
its commitment to the ICC by consistently calling upon African countries to 
ratify the Rome Statute and to ensure that they take legislative measures to 
make the Statute applicable in the domestic laws of their respective 
countries.56 During its 24th Ordinary Session, which was held in October 
1998, the ACHPR passed a resolution that urged African countries to ratify 
the Rome Statute and to take “legislative and administrative steps to bring 
 
 
51  Id. 
52  du Plessis, The International Criminal Court and Its Work in Africa, supra note 47, at 5. 
53  The declaration was made under Rome Statute art. 12(3), supra note 1, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 99. 
54  Letter from Alassane Ouattara, President Côte d'Ivoire, to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
(Dec. 14, 2010), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/498E8FEB-7A72-4005-A209-
C14BA374804F/0/ReconCPI.pdf. A further letter was sent to the Court by Ouattara on May 3, 2011, 
reconfirming the state's acceptance of its jurisdiction. For the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, see Situations and 
Cases – Côte d’Ivoire, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi (last accessed Mar. 9, 2020) (Côte 
d'Ivoire eventually ratified the Rome Statute on Feb. 15, 2013).  
55  Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 445, 
450 (2009). 
56  Cole, supra note 38, at 674.  
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national laws and policies into conformity” with it.57 This was followed by the 
adoption of a resolution in 2005 that also called on African countries to 
domesticate and implement the Rome Statute.58 Other African Non-
Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) created the Coalition for the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (the “Coalition”).59 The 
Coalition, made up of African NGO’s and their counterparts in the West, had 
the aim of encouraging African Governments to ratify the Rome Statute.60  
The effort by the African states and civil society groups, as well as 
NGOs, during the establishment of the ICC is indicative of the strong and 
consistent support for the Court. It demonstrates the need to advance stronger 
national laws that deliver justice to victims of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide and possibly put an end to the impunity with which 
some African leaders ruled their territories.61 
B. Origins of the AU-ICC Rift 
In the aftermath of the horrendous acts committed by the Nazis during 
the Holocaust, the world swore that never again would such horrific crimes 
be permitted to occur anywhere in the world.62 However, since the Holocaust, 
the world has witnessed the commission of further serious human rights 
violations and crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic 
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cleansing, and genocide. International Humanitarian Law has been violated in 
Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, especially in the 
Balkans,63 highlighting the shift from international to non-international armed 
conflict. There have also been unabated violations of human rights in 
Myanmar, Sudan, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Libya, and Syria to 
cite just some examples. 64 This shows clearly that the world has learnt either 
little or nothing from the Holocaust, a failure to act and an omission which the 
former UNSG, Kofi Annan, castigated in his famous plea for the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court.65 The establishment of the 
ICC in 2002 brought hope to many, especially African states, who expressed 
optimism that the perpetrators of genocide, various crimes against humanity 
and war crimes would finally be held responsible for their crimes.66 Some 
countries quickly referred cases to the ICC: Uganda,67 Democratic Republic 
of Congo (“DRC”),68 and the Central African Republic.69 These referrals were 
relatively uncontroversial and showed the commitment of African states 
commitment to the development of human rights as well as combatting 
impunity.70  
However, this seemingly goodwill relationship between Africa and the 
ICC began to turn sour when the ICC turned its focus on Africa’s political 
leaders and government officials, who under customary international law were 
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considered to possess some form of immunity.71 This impasse between the AU 
and the ICC began with the arrest warrant issued by Belgium for the DRC’s 
then-minister for foreign affairs, Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, in 2000, 
which was not well taken by the African States.72 In 2008, Rose Kabuye, the 
Chief of Protocol to Rwandan President Paul Kagame, was arrested in 
Germany on a French arrest warrant for the 1994 destruction of the plane 
carrying the former president of Rwanda. This crime is thought to have 
triggered the Rwandan genocide.73 The charges were dropped in 2009.This 
incident was raised at the United Nations by President Kagame who asserted 
that the criminal proceedings constituted the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by European states with the sole intention of shaming the political leaders of 
Africa.74 
The impasse between the two institutions went on to another level with 
the referral (for investigation and even prosecution) by the United Nations 
Security Council to the ICC, the situation in Darfur, Sudan, under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter and pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. 75 When 
it became obvious that the then-President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-
Bashir,, was to be investigated by the ICC, there was a concerted effort to stay 
the investigation by many in Africa and the Middle East because it was 
contrary to customary international law.76  
Tensions between the African Union and the ICC grew to a higher level 
when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, despite calls for a stay 
of investigations. These calls were made firstly because he was a sitting head 
of state and secondly because he belonged to a state not a party to the Rome 
Statute.77 The arrest warrant issued by the Court over the Sudanese President 
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became the focal point of the African Union’s concerns about its 
dissatisfaction with the approach used by both the UNSC and the ICC to tackle 
international criminal justice issues in Africa.78  
There were two fundamental and related questions that were asked by 
legal experts in the wake of the arrest warrant for Al-Bashir: 1) whether 
immunities granted as a matter of customary international law to a head of 
state may be waived by a treaty (in this case the Rome Statute), and 2) what 
was the impact of a referral by the UNSC as it pertains to the relationship 
between Articles 27 and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.79 
In order to find a solution to the issue at hand, the African Union Peace 
and Security Council (“PSC”) then requested that the UNSC utilize its power 
provided for in the Rome Statute to defer the ICC process as this was to 
compromise any regional peace initiatives.80 This was due to the fact that the 
Statute provides that: 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after 
the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to 
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions.81 
According to the African Union, this stay of investigation was 
requested in order not to “undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating 
the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur” as well as alleviate the suffering 
caused by the conflict.82 To add to this, there had been earlier efforts at 
mediation to help resolve the crisis in Darfur, and there were concerns by 
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observers at that time that involving the ICC at that moment would further 
derail the efforts to maintain peace.83  
The approach taken by the African Union at that time can be described 
as a logical approach, bearing in mind that this was the first time the UNSC 
was using its power under Article 13 of the Rome Statute to activate the 
jurisdiction of the Court to investigate a situation within the territory of a state 
that was not party to the Statute.84 Many African leaders spoke up against the 
ICC’s alleged persecution of Al-Bashir, which was deemed to be contrary to 
the customary international law principle of Head of State immunity as a 
manifestation of the principle of sovereign equality under Article 2(4) UN 
Charter. This dissent was highlighted in a remark made by the late former 
Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika, then-chairperson of the African 
Union, at the July 2010 AU Summit: 
To subject a sovereign head of state to a warrant of arrest is 
undermining African solidarity and African peace and security 
that we fought for so many years . . . there is a general concern 
in Africa that the issuance of a warrant of arrest for . . . al-Bashir, 
a duly elected president, is a violation of the principles of 
sovereignty guaranteed under the United Nations and under the 
African Union Charter. Maybe there are other ways of addressing 
this problem.85 
Notwithstanding, the UNSC failed to grant the deferral request, which 
was considered a legal matter and as a result of that, the African Union felt 
slighted by the action of the UNSC.86 The growing dissent in Africa was 
further compounded by the subsequent referral of Libya by the UNSC to the 
Court in 2011. Here again, an African Union’s request for deferral was not 
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granted.87 The African Union was ostentiously disappointed with the politics 
of referrals and alleged that the UNSC had been selective in its choice of 
referring cases which involved African states.88 This was because the same 
power of deferral stated in the Rome Statue was used to protect peace keeping 
officers in Sudan from prosecution for any breach of international norms as a 
result of pressure from the United States.89 The African Union then took a 
defiant stance and issued a decision that African states would not cooperate in 
the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir.90 
What used to be a troubled relationship with the ICC had by this time 
become so toxic that the African Union commenced a non-cooperation policy 
towards the ICC. Since then, the Court has been criticized for pursuing a racist 
agenda against Africans and possessing an investigative system that is flawed 
and that also suffers from undue delays.91 Fatou Bensouda, the current Chief 
Prosecutor and an African hailing from the Gambia, has refuted these 
allegations, arguing that the African Union is bent on protecting the 
perpetrators of these heinous crimes.92 The intensity of the debate surrounding 
the impasse between African Union and ICC has worsened over the years and 
has negatively impacted the relationship between these two organizations and 
has the potential to be detrimental to the international legal order because most 
African states, as well as other states, have reservations about the legitimacy 
of the ICC’s work and mission.93  
Also, this impasse has placed some African states that are signatories 
to the ICC in a difficult situation regarding their obligations to both the 
African Union and the ICC. States that are party to the Statute are under 
obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution 
of crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Court.94 However, the 
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Constitutive Act of the African Union on the other hand warns that sanctions 
will be imposed on any member state that does not comply with decisions of 
the African Union.95  
 The anti-ICC stance taken by the African Union has further added to 
the disappointment of victims of violent crimes in seeing justice being denied. 
The impasse seems to further reinforce public opinion that such egregious 
crimes against humanity on the continent are to continue with impunity, a 
sentiment which should definitely not be the case.96 
C. Past Unsuccessful Attempts to Resolve the Impasse  
For a while, the AU-ICC problem was not considered a priority by the 
Court and majority of its State Parties. Even though the Court faced some 
backlash due to the indictment of Al-Bashir, the Chief Prosecutor during that 
period, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, rebutted the claims. He stated that his position 
was to “apply the law without bowing to political consideration.”97 The UNSC 
also proved unwilling to address the various concerns brought up by the 
African states.98 However, in recent times, the Court (led by its current Chief 
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda) and Assembly of State Parties (“ASP”) have 
made efforts to attend to the issues raised by the African states more seriously. 
The Office of the Chief Prosecutor (“OTP”) has since called for dialogue 
between the two organizations, and this has been supported by a majority of 
the State Parties.99 Although Bensouda is still following the strategy of her 
predecessor by emphasizing that she cannot take into account political 
considerations, she has duly acknowledged the issues of African states and 
has utilized her diplomatic leverage to ease the ongoing tensions.100 One of 
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the steps taken to amend the friction was the acceptance of the African Union’s 
demands during the ASP annual meeting in 2013. Here, the rules of the Court’s 
regarding the presence at trial for accused who occupy positions at the highest 
national level was amended.101 This amendment was made to help reduce the 
amount of time that Kenya’s President Kenyatta and his deputy, Ruto, would 
have to spend at the Hague during the proceedings of their indictmentbefore 
the charges were withdrawn in 2014 and 2016 respectively.102 
The amendment of rules regarding the presence of high ranking state 
officials as well as the withdrawal of the charges were welcomed by the 
African Union Assembly, but the Assembly still expressed dissatisfaction that 
the Council had not acted on the issues of deferrals.103 To ensure that future 
requests for deferrals were not ignored by the UNSC, and to prevent other 
heads of states from being indicted, the African Union Assembly called for 
several amendments to the Rome Statute. Most crucially, it demanded that the 
UNGA be given the power to defer the proceedings of the Court and mandated 
that Heads of State be granted immunity from prosecution during their time 
in office.104 The Assembly further made moves to fast track the establishment 
of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African 
Court”). It is the African Union’s aim that this Court will in future possess 
jurisdiction over the four main international crimes being tried by the ICC and 
potentially function as a regional alternative to the ICC as well.105 The 
Amendment Protocol of this Court, which was adopted by the African Union 
Assembly in 2014, further provides immunity for sitting heads of state.106 The 
subsequent withdrawal of charges by the ICC against Kenyatta in 2014 based 
on allegations of lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government by the 
Chief Prosecutor was also welcomed by the African Union and the tensions 
between the two organizations seemed to have lessened to an extent. However, 
the issue of immunity of heads of states has since not been settled and the 
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allegation that the ICC still has its focus only on Africa while several crimes 
against humanity continue to occur around the world is still considered true 
by many.107 
D. Why did the African Union opt for a New Approach? 
The African Union, at its 30th summit in 2018, finally decided to make 
a request to the UNGA to seek an AO from the ICJ.108 This was, however, not 
the first time the ICJ discussed seeking an AO from the Court. In 2012, the 
African Union Assembly requested the African Union commission to consider 
seeking an AO from the ICJ, which was eventually not followed up.109 Kenya, 
on behalf of the African Union, subsequently made a formal request included 
in the provisional agenda of the 73 UNGA meeting held in September 2018, 
under the heading “Request for an AO of the International Court of Justice on 
the consequences of legal obligations of States under different sources of 
international law with respect to immunities of Heads of State and 
Government and other senior officials.”110 
This is relevant because legal experts have welcomed the move by the 
African Union to seek an AO from the ICJ that they consider useful for 
political reasons. This is because there is currently so much distrust on this 
issue between the African Union and the ICC and it very unlikely that African 
states would accept a decision of the ICC on this matter.111 Also, the decisions 
made by the ICC on the issue of immunity and the noncooperation of certain 
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states regarding the arrest warrant of Al-Bashir have so far been criticised as 
inconsistent and unpredictable by legal experts.112 In its ruling on Malawi and 
Chad in 2011, the Court held that customary international law gives no 
exception for heads-of-state immunity in relation to international courts’ 
jurisdiction.113 In a follow up decision in 2014 on the DRC, the Court held 
that UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) implicitly waives the immunities enjoyed 
by the Sudanese President.114 On the other hand, in its decision on South 
Africa and Jordan (2017), the Court’s majority determined that Sudan (as a 
non-state party) had rights and duties parallel to a state party by virtue of 
Resolution 1593 and that Article 98(1) would not apply. Even though the 
conclusions of all the decisions was that Al-Bashir was not immune from 
arrest and thus states failed in their duty to arrest him, many do not agree with 
the legal reasoning by the Pre-Trial Chamber as each ruling came to the same 
conclusion with divergent and (even) incompatible legal arguments.115 These 
“conflicting” determinations to the same issue do not augur well for 
jurisprudence, and hence an opinion by the ICJ would probably put the matter 
to rest.116  
The legal issue of whether state obligations to the ICC—such as 
extradition–overrule conflicting customary international law, which may offer 
immunity to incumbent Heads of State and other key cabinet ministers 
remains contentious117 Another issue of concern is that, while the Judges of 
the Court have the ability to determine relevant state obligations to the ICC, 
it is not clear as to whether they are competent enough to ascertain whether a 
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state has relevant competing or conflicting responsibilities to other 
international bodies, such as the African Union.118 
These views and concerns were well highlighted in the request Kenya 
made on behalf of the African Union to the United Nation General 
Assembly,which sums up the potential benefits to the future ICC-AU 
cooperation in general and the provision of a lasting resolution to the long-
disputed issue of immunities and the conflicting obligations of States under 
international law. The relevance of the points raised by the AU request and its 
intended benefits are noteworthy and are provided below in full: 
(a) “Members of the United Nations will benefit from a General 
Assembly request for an AO of the International Court of Justice that 
will provide clarity to the evident ambiguity and to competing 
obligations under international law and will assist States in carrying out 
their obligations without undermining either the call for ending 
impunity or the legal regime governing the immunities of Heads of 
State and Government and other senior officials.”119  
(b) “By having recourse to the International Court of Justice, as the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the General Assembly 
would3 also underscore its resolve to give effect to the mission 
entrusted to it by the Members of the United Nations to ensure the 
appropriate implementation of international legal norms within the 
work of the United Nations and its Member States.”120 
(c) “the divergence of States’ practices and relying on their own 
interpretation rather than recourse to available international justice 
mechanisms thereby undermine the international justice system and the 
legal regime governing relations between States in its entirety.”121 
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Another argument that has been put across in favor and support of the 
request for an AO is that the ICJ is in a better position to address all the 
international law issues put up by the African Union as well as other issues 
proceeding from the Rome Statute. These arguments are bolstered by the fact 
that the ICJ has previously handled similar questions related to the state of 
immunity under customary international law and also the status of Resolutions 
from the Security Council.122 Thus, the ICJ, a court that has no links to the 
Rome Statute and is the primary international tribunal on issues of general 
international law, is seen by many as the solution to making inroads on this 
contentious matter.123  
On July 9, 2018, Kenya, acting on behalf of the AU Group in New York, 
made the request to the UN General Assembly to have the African Union’s 
decision to approach the ICJ included in the provisional agenda of the 73rd 
Session of the UNGA.124 The request was granted and the African Union’s 
request subsequently included in the provisional agenda number A/73/144.125 
It is worthy to note that the procedure of obtaining an AO from the ICJ will 
be an extensive one. First and foremost, the African group at the United 
Nations must lobby to gain a majority vote within the UNGA, and then the 
ICJ will have the prerogative whether to offer its opinion or otherwise.126 
However, the ICJ has never refused to give its (advisory) opinion on any case 
as long as its jurisdiction applies, like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (“PCIJ”), and this case may not be an exception.127 
It can only be hoped that the aim of this call for an AO by the ICJ was 
not driven by the motivation to placate opportunistic states that have become 
disgruntled with the Court. Instead the sole motivation should be to find a way 
for the ICC, which depends solely on the cooperation of States to deliver on 
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its mandate of ending impunity for crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide and aggression.128 
III. ASSESSING THE LIKELY NATURE OF THE AU-ICJ RELATIONSHIP AFTER 
AN ICJ DECISION 
We will now discuss the likely implications that may arise in the light 
of a (potential) ruling either against or in favor of the African Union as well 
as the potential impact of the ICJ decision on pending cases involving 
Africans before the ICC. Also, the potential for the AU and the ICC to utilize 
such a ruling to foster a new consensus will be touched upon. 
A. The ICJ Finds Against the African Union 
There have been various opinions about the likely outcome of the ICJ 
ruling and what its impact would be on the current relationship between the 
two bodies. Some legal scholars suspect that the ICJ’s final decision may not 
favor the African Union.129 Even though the request of the African Union for 
an AO follows the above mentioned institutional due processes of both the 
AU and potentially the UN GA, it still carries the potential of a diplomatic 
confrontation. Requesting the ICJ to provide an AO on the issue of issue of 
immunities and the conflicting obligations of States has been described as 
similar to appealing against the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision directly to 
the ICJ instead of approaching the Appeals Chamber of the ICC. Such a step 
would be tantamount to judicial confrontation.130 
In support of such predictions of an unfavorable outcome is the fact 
that, while the African Union disagrees with the ICC on this issue of head-of-
state immunity, there are African courts that have issued rulings on this issue 
that lean in favor of the ICC’s position.131 For instance, the Kenyan Court of 
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Appeal on February 6, 2018 held that “as a matter of general customary 
international law it is no longer in doubt that a Head of State will personally 
be liable if there is sufficient evidence that he authorized or perpetrated those 
internationally recognized serious crimes.”132 Hence the Kenyan Government 
acted with impunity when it failed to arrest Al-Bashir in 2010, thus breaching 
Kenyan domestic law, its constitution, and international treaties like the Rome 
Statute.133 The Kenyan judgement resonates with the one from the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal, which ruled unanimously that the South 
African government’s refusal to arrest Al-Bashir was inconsistent with its 
obligations to the Rome Statute, as well as Section 10 of the ICC Act. 134 
Therefore, while many view the request to the ICJ as a promising move for 
political reasons, the legal decisions from national courts with authority in 
Africa does not augur well for the African Union’s chances to secure a 
promising outcome at the ICJ.135 
Correspondingly, others have posited that the Rome Statute does not 
provide the means by which the ICJ can be asked to provide an AO on an issue 
that the ICC is currently adressing. Furthermore, while the UNGA has the 
authority to make such a request, this move would be equivalent to 
sidestepping the authority of the ICC. Such a move would effectively allow 
the African Union to engage in a form of “forum shopping,” which may cause 
new tensions to arise between the ICJ and ICC.136 Another perspective is that 
the request for an AO is an attempt of the African Union to control the ICC, 
and this would be equivalent to sidelining the Court to indulge another forum 
for adjudication.137 Another issue under discussion is that the ICC is under no 
obligation to accede to the reasoning of the ICJ should it decide in favour of 
the AU. This potential backing of the ICC by the ICJ had been predicted by 
legal scholars as a move to avoid clashes between the two Courts, which 
 
 
132  Id.  
133  Attorney General and  2 Others v. Kenya Section of International Commission of Jurists [2018] 
eKLR, Civil Appeal 105 of 2012 & Criminal Appeal 274 of 2011 (Feb. 16, 2018) 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/148746/; see Kemp, supra note 128, at 76. 
134  Van der Merwe, supra note 131.  
135  Id. 
136  Akande, ICC Issues, supra note 115. 
137  Id.  
APRIL 2020 AFRICAN UNION-ICC CONTROVERSY 271 
 
 
 
would eventually be an unhealthy reflection on their legacies in the event that 
they both adopt opposing legal positions on the same issue.138  
1. The African Union could return to Its Plan to Establish a Regional 
Criminal Court 
As mentioned above, an unfavorable ruling for the African Union may 
serve as a catalyst for the establishment of an African regional criminal court. 
The quest for establishing a regional court to try crimes of international nature 
by the African Union began in the 1970s during the discussion on the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.139 Many commentators have, 
however, alluded to the fact that the Africa’s quest for establishing a regional 
criminal court of its own was motivated politically and commenced as an 
import of the crises between the African Union and the ICC over the arrest 
warrant for Al-Bashir.140 Even though it cannot be denied that the Al-Bashir 
case has intensified the desire of Africa to prosecute international crimes on 
its own, it may be misleading to say that this case is the underpinning of the 
African quest for jurisdiction over international crimes committed against 
humanity.141 Notwithstanding, the calls for a regional criminal court have 
intensified since 2009.142 Earlier in 2006, ideas started coming up for the court 
when The Summit of the African Union Heads of State and Governments met 
in Khartoum, Sudan, and agreed to set up a Committee of Eminent African 
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Jurists on the Case of Hissène Habré (the “Committee”).143 The Committee 
observed that “there is room in the Rome Statute for such a development and 
that it would not be a duplication of the work of the International Criminal 
Court.”144 In the Committee’s opinion Articles 1 and 17 of the Rome Statute 
focus on the issue of complementarity of the jurisdictions of national courts 
and does not recognise regional jurisdictions. This position did not prevent the 
establishment of such regional courts in co-existence with the ICC because 
such a regional court may not be answerable to the ICC.145 
2. The Need for Establishing An African Regional Criminal Court 
According to an expert on International Law and Organizations, 
Professor Ademola Abass, there are three central reasons that support the 
establishment of an African regional criminal court to prosecute crimes of 
international nature in tangent with the ICC.  
Firstly, and as mentioned earlier, the desire to create this court was 
expressed in the 1970s with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. However, the committee responsible for the Charter did not agree to 
the proposal to embrace a court as part of the Charter with international 
criminal jurisdiction in its provisions.146 It argued that it was premature to 
establish such a court since the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid had already made a provision for 
“an international penal court”147 and the United Nations at that time was 
considering establishing “an international court to repress crime against 
mankind.”148 The proposal was therefore motivated by the crime of 
“Apartheid” in South Africa, which had then been regarded by the UNGA as 
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a crime against humanity149 as early as 1966 and informed the debate in the 
1970s. This view regarding the nature of which was also reaffirmed by the 
UNSC in 1984.150 Apartheid existed in South Africa from 1948 until 1993, 
and even though it was recognized as an international crime, there was no 
internationally established court to prosecute the crime. A prosecution of the 
crime before any competent domestic or international tribunal never 
materialized.151 Hence, States were left on their own to pass legislation that 
would enable them to prosecute the crime of apartheid and to try criminals of 
apartheid on the basis of a form of universal jurisdiction. South Africa’s 
system of racial segregation and discrimination, Apartheid, had a huge impact 
on the lives of South Africans as well as the African Continent. The failure to 
prosecute the crime of Apartheid during its “lifetime” in South Africa 
highlights the often-difficult reality of achieving criminal justice in Africa – 
not least due to political and other reasons. The crime of Apartheid can now 
be prosecuted as a crime against humanity under Article 7 (1) (j) of the Rome 
Statute.152 Thus, the need to create Africa’s own criminal court was further 
heightened at that time, and according to some commentators, that need still 
pertains today.153 Interesting in this context and highlighting the above 
political dynamics of bringing international justice to Africa is the observation 
that the new post Apartheid South Africa hasn’t signed up to the Apartheid 
Convention post 1994 (despite the relevance of this UN Convention and its 
universal scope of application), leaving the ICC the only available avenue for 
any judicial redress.154 
Secondly, the Constitutive Act (“AU Act”) of the African Union as well 
as other treaties provide the necessary legal basis to prosecute crimes of 
international nature.155 The AU Act provides for “the right of the Union to 
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intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect 
of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and 
stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the 
Peace and Security Council.”156 These crimes (apart from the “threat to 
legitimate order”) are in tangent with the international crimes over which the 
ICC has jurisdiction. It is therefore necessary for the African Union to take 
the necessary steps to address these violations stipulated in the AU Act. This 
is because in the instance where there had been no established international 
criminal tribunal like the ICC to prosecute these crimes, the obligation to 
prosecute these crimes would definitely fall on the African Union. One may 
argue that national courts have the jurisdiction to prosecute such cases but 
sadly these crimes are committed by people who hold political power, and 
efficient prosecution of such crimes has always presented a difficulty in Africa 
where political manipulation of the judiciary is rife.  
In addition, other African states would not be willing to prosecute their 
fellow high-profile defendants on the basis of the much-criticized principle of 
universal jurisdiction, hence the need for the African Union to provide a 
system to deal with such issues.157 Reference can be made to the case of 
Hissène Habré, the former president of Chad. An arrest warrant was issued for 
Habré by Belgium while he was seeking asylum in Senegal. Senegal declined 
to deport the accused to Belgium and with the advice of the African Union 
decided instead to prosecute the culprit.158 Senegal also refused to give Habré 
back to Chad for prosecution even though both countries possessed the 
jurisdiction to do so, claiming head of state immunity which most African 
states subscribe to.159 The decision of the African Union to allow Senegal to 
prosecute Habré was the only probable option because The Committee of 
Eminent African Jurists,160 established by the African Union to specifically 
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provide advice on all implications of the Habré case, reported that none of the 
two African courts possessed the powers to prosecute the accused.161 The 
Committee thus made a recommendation that would apply to future cases 
when stating that: “. . . the possibility of conferring criminal jurisdiction on 
the African Court of Justice [to confer criminal competence that can be 
adopted by states within a reasonable time-frame] to make the respect for 
human rights at national, regional and continental levels a fundamental tenet 
of African governance.”162 
In essence, Habré’s case reveals that neither the courts of Africa, which were 
set up to deal with such criminals—especially those found in power— nor the 
courts of other African states have the credibility to deliver justice when faced 
with such circumstances. Thus, there is the need to adhere to Committee 
recommendation to establish a regional court that can successfully prosecute 
such crimes. 
Thirdly and lastly, it is worth noting that, apart from the general 
obligation that the AU Act and other treaties imposes on the African Union, 
there are other crimes that the African Union is obliged to prosecute that are 
peculiar to Africa and where the ICC has no jurisdiction. The fact that these 
crimes are not included in the Rome Statute are implications of the fact that 
the ASP does not find these crimes to be “serious” enough to come under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, but they do occur in Africa all the time to the detriment 
of its development. One of these crimes included in this section is the so called 
Unconstitutional Change of Governments (“UCGs”) criminal offence, coup 
respectively, and its associated problems that have plagued most African 
countries to date, such as Zimbabwe, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Burundi being 
the most recently affected.163  
The extensive damage caused by these UCGs to the peace and stability 
of African countries caused the African Union to adopt the African Charter on 
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Democracy, Election, and Governance (“ACDEG”) in 2003.164 The Charter, 
which came into force in 2012, outlaws and criminalizes all acts which 
constitute UCGs165. This would ensure that there is a reduction in the spate of 
armed conflicts as well as a better observance of the rule of law.166 The Rome 
Statute allows for the prosecution of the so called “core crimes” as “the most 
serious crimes of international concern”167 which are often committed with a 
nexus to an armed conflict but also in non conflict circumstances like the 
present persecution of ethnic Uighurs by China as a potential crime against 
humanity in terms of the Rome Statute168. The ICC as a criminal court is first 
of all a judicial body that responds to crimes which have been committed with 
the futher ultimate goal of creating prevention through an element of 
deterrence for any future perpetrator of such crimes. By proscribing UCGs, 
the African Union has added to this preventive aim by ensuring that acts 
within the remit of UCGs precipitate crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction 
over.169 It is, however, crucial that for the African Union to proscribe a crime 
such as UCG, which is not recognized universally as an international crime, 
its status under international law must first be taken into consideration.170 The 
handling of UCGs is one of the few norms that can be described to have 
gradually evolved through custom and finally ending up in the categorization 
of the ACDEG. In the early days when UCGs were rampant on the African 
continent, there were several declarations made to condemn the act until its 
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status was finally confirmed by the entry into force of the treaty in 2012.171 
UCGs have reduced over the last couple of years but there must come a time 
that they would be a thing of the past in order to aid the development of the 
African Agenda of maintaining peace and the rule of law at all times. 
The foregoing sections have thus discussed the need to establish an 
African regional criminal court which would enable Africa to better handle its 
affairs without facing further “prejudice” as is currently alleged to be 
happening at the ICC. The move to establish this Court has been a long 
winding journey, however, it is the hope of many that it will finally come to 
fruition in the future. 
3. The Threats of Mass African Withdrawal from the ICC may become a 
reality 
It has also been speculated by legal commentators that a ruling against 
the African Union would finally lead to mass African exodus from the ICC.172 
There have already been threats of such a move in the past following reports 
by the media in 2017 that the African Union had adopted a plan for mass 
withdrawal from the ICC.173 Earlier on in 2016, three countries, Burundi, 
South Africa, and Gambia, put in applications to the UN Secretary General of 
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their intentions to leave the ICC. South Africa and Gambia later withdrew 
their applications, but Burundi went ahead and became the first state to 
withdraw from the ICC.174 The possibility of a collective withdrawal, which 
has been in the works for some time, symbolizes the high-water mark of 
African Union opposition to the ICC.175  
One of the underlying issues that has fueled the move for a mass 
withdrawal is the UNSC. At the time of writing, three out of the five members 
of the Security Council (United States of America, Russia, and China) are not 
party to the Rome Statute due to their own particular reasons. However, the 
Rome Statute gives the UNSC powers to refer cases to the ICC176 in the 
absence of referrals by State Parties or in cases where the crime has been 
committed outside the jurisdiction of the Court.177 It is truly hypocritical and 
highlights the outdated nature of our post-1945 UN system that the states of 
Russia, US and China, which continue to refuse to be held accountable by the 
Rome Statute, are in a position to referee cases to the Court through their role 
as UNSC permanent members.178 Even more troubling is the fact that the 
Security Council has not always been consistent in referring war crimes. On 
several occasions, the United States vetoed resolutions of the UNSC regarding 
war crimes committed by Israel on the territory of Palestine. Also, China and 
Russia have vetoed UN draft resolutions to refer the case of Syria and the 
Rohingya people in Myanmar to the ICC, despite the fact that African 
countries have consistently called for the UNSC to refer these cases.179  
This brings to the fore the question of whether Africa should continue 
to engage with the Court when it has no veto power to make decisions on 
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issues, especially those pertaining to African countries.180 Another example of 
selective referrals is the United Kingdom’s alliance with the United States to 
go to war with Iraq. The then UN Secretary General, the late Kofi Annan, 
explicitly stated that the war on Iraq breached the UN Charter and was 
therefore illegal.181 A criminal prosecution of either former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair or his senior military officers before the ICC for the crime 
of aggression was impossible, as this crime only came into existence in 
2017.182 While the Iraqi campaign of 2003 clearly lacked legality, a 
prosecution under the Rome Statute was not possible, as this would have 
amounted to a violation of the Court’s non-retroactivity principle.183 Given the 
illegality and therefore immorality of the Iraq war and the apparent impunity 
for the decision makers at that time, it was only a question of time until African 
leaders, politicians and academics would point to this example of Western 
hypocrisis. Questions could be asked whether the Western powers that engage 
in such crimes were above the law. Some critics went even so far to view this 
as an example of the Court’s use of selective justice and enforcement of the 
law in a rather “tyrannical” fashion.184 Understandable as such criticism might 
be, it lacks the legal basis as stated above, but Western denial and lack of 
legitimacy regarding the justification for the war in Iraq continues to tarnish 
the ICC’s overall legitimacy and future potential.  
Also often forgotten in this debate are the actual victims of these crimes. 
These victims have no access to justice and the tensions between the African 
Union and the ICC have incapacitated the African Union by making it lose 
focus, which has frustrated the efforts to make the necessary reparations to the 
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victims. Hence, it has been suggested that severing ties with the ICC could 
possibly give the African Union to chance to organize its internal affairs 
appropriately thereby bringing justice and peace to the victims.185 
However and despite the seeming justified stance of the African Union, 
the threats of a mass withdrawal due to these challenges would not augur well 
for both the African Union and the ICC and various legal experts have asserted 
that such a move would definitely be the “death” of the ICC and in 
international criminal justice.186 This would also be detrimental to 
international criminal law because to some it is "better to have an imperfect 
court than none at all. It's like saying because we don't catch all the criminals, 
we shouldn't hold trials."187 Former ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, has also described the move as a dangerous one and described the 
action of the African Leaders as “hypocritical.”188 His comments remind one 
of the overall strong support the ICC initially enjoyed in Africa. One should 
also bear in mind that there have been cases of “trade offs” between the Court 
and post conflict governments with sometimes dubious human rights records 
themselves during the initial years of the Court’s existence. This immunity in 
exchange for collaboration could indeed be seen as hypocritical.189 He warned 
that victims of these atrocities would continue to suffer under the leadership 
of those who perpetrate these crimes if they are not held accountable for their 
actions.190 It is therefore expedient for the ICC and the African Union to find 
middle grounds on this issue of immunity of heads of states thereby anchoring 
justice firmly to the process of long-term global peace. 
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B. If the ICJ Finds in Favor of the African Union 
What would happen if the opposite came true and the ICJ was to find 
in favor of the African Union? Some legal experts have posited that such a 
finding would be beneficial to the wider international legal discourse as 
such.191 At least, it would serve as a vindication of the political opposition of 
the African Union to the ICC. As stated supra, a favorable ruling may support 
the legal reasoning of the African Union and hopefully put to rest all the issues 
surrounding immunities of heads of states under international law. It would 
also mean that such an ICJ ruling would be in tangent with the African Union 
argument whereas heads of states are immune from prosecution by either the 
ICC or national authorities seeking to cooperate with the ICC.192 In the case 
of immunity from prosecution by the ICC, the African Union has always 
argued that customary international law grants immunity from the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals. In the case of immunity before national courts, the 
African Union has made three assertions over the years: firstly, asserting that 
there exists such immunity for head of states (and other governmental heads) 
under customary law; secondly, previous Afrocan Union treaties and decisions 
(like the OAU General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
OAU) grant immunities to heads of states; and finally, these immunities are 
spelt out in Art 98 of the Rome Statute and therefore should take effect at all 
times when the need arises.193 Thus African States were, and are still, under 
no obligation to arrest Al-Bashir, and the Pre Trial Chamber failed to take Art 
98 into consideration when it issued the arrest warrants for Al-Bashir in 2009 
and 2010.194 A ruling in favor of the African Union would potentially highlight 
the fact that the issues raised by the African Union over the years have been 
legally right would probably set a precedent that would guide future legal 
discourse.  
There have been legal opinions that a ruling in favor of the African 
Union would vindicate the political stance of the African Union questioning 
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the legitimacy of the ICC. Over the years, the practices utilized by the ICC 
have caused legal experts to question the legitimacy of the Court.195 The ICC 
has to be seen as an institution wrenched between the demands of legalism, 
legitimacy respectively, and the demands arising out of the broader political 
and diplomatic context of the environments in which it operates.196 It is yet to 
strike a balance between the two conflicting demands which is threatening its 
survival.197 The ICC’s legitimacy has also been questioned over the past years 
due to its inability to dutifully construct the rules and apply them in strict 
compliance as stipulated in the Rome Statute. Indeed, the practices employed 
by the Court have departed from the text of the law on many occasions and 
this has caused various party states and observers to further question the 
Court’s method of interpreting the law.198  
In the Pre Trial Chamber decisions made on the arrest of Al-Bashir in 
ICC states the Court arrived at the same conclusion while using varied and 
conflicting legal arguments with which many legal experts have since 
disagreed.199 This has further fueled the assertion that the Court is more 
political than legal.200 For instance, the Court buckled under political pressure 
from the United States when the Chief Prosecutor attempted to investigate 
potential war crimes by US soldiers in Afghanistan.201 The United States 
issued various threats and stated that it would impose restrictions on any ICC 
staff who investigated US or allied personnel. These counter measures did, 
however, constitute an improvement from a 2002 announcement by the Bush 
Administration that it would even use military force to “free” U.S. Service 
Members detained by or on behalf of the Court under U.S. legislation that 
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became infamously known as the “Hague Invasion Act.”202 It followed its 
threats by revoking the Chief Prosecutor’s U.S. visa in April, 2019.203 The 
ICC quickly relented, and the Panel of Judges announced a few weeks later 
that it had rejected the Chief Prosecutor’s request would no longer pursue the 
case of Afghanistan.204 
These acts giving political preference to powerful nations demonstrates 
how the Court has become a tool for Western domination to the detriment of 
lesser states. Another example of political dominance is the Kenyan case. 
President Kenyatta and his deputy, Ruto, made a statement that they would 
only cooperate with the Court if their trials are conducted on alternative 
days.205 The Trial Chamber thus reversed its stance on the issue206 without 
resorting to any form of clarification, which caused many to ask whether the 
judges or the accused were in charge of the case. Following the lack of 
cooperation from the Kenyan Government in producing evidence, the Chief 
Prosecutor was forced to abandon the case in the long run.207 This case also 
questions the legitimacy of the Court when it bases its decisions on statements 
made by political leaders who stand accused. Moving forward, there is the 
need for the ICC as an institution to gain back its legitimacy by impartially 
identifying and applying its legal rules objectively devoid of any political 
considerations and pressures. 
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C. A Ruling as a Potential Draw and Compromise 
Apart from the two alternatives favoring one of the two parties to the 
dispute, there is further possibility that the ICJ’s AO would not declare one 
institution victorious over the other but recommend a conciliatory 
compromise. Both the African Union and the ICC have posited various legal 
arguments to support their stance on the issue of immunity. Thus, the ICJ may 
try to find a middle ground where both parties can reach a consensus in order 
to forge ahead with the quest of dealing with perpetrators that are involved in 
war crimes which is very important to both parties. It is the view of some legal 
commentators that a) the ICJ will exercise its discretion in a manner that 
would ensure uniformity of the law by taking into consideration the legal 
arguments from both organizations and b) will make its decision from the 
perspective of customary international law.208 In effect, the relationship 
between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute would be clarified in a manner 
that would avert further controversy.209 
1. Reduction of Future Tensions Between the ICC and Other National 
Jurisdictions Beyond Africa 
Due to (mostly unfounded) allegations of bias and lack of effectiveness 
against the ICC, states which have not ratified the Rome Statute seem to be in 
no hurry to do so. Far from becoming a World Court with global reach as some 
feared, the ICC’s deficiencies in terms of its jurisdiction, the conduct of 
preliminary investigations, and its overall inability to shake off the 
perceptions of constituting “selective justice” have already impacted 
negatively on its overall legitimacy around the world.210 The AO by the ICJ 
would therefore provide much need clarification and generally set a (non-
binding) “precedent,” which could be referred to in other jurisdictions beyond 
Africa in the future. Whatever the outcome is, there should be a guiding 
principle on head-of-state immunity under international law and specifically 
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for heads of states that are not party to various treaties regardinginternational 
criminal justice. This would generally put to rest the legal tussle between the 
two organizations. Also, the tensions between the African Union and the ICC 
would be averted in similar future cases beyond Africa. Likewise, other states 
may be encouraged to engage with the ICC without fearing the loss of 
sovereignty.  
2. The Impact of the ICJ Decision on Pending Cases From Africa Before 
the ICC 
It has been argued in some quarters that the request of the African Union 
is not an attempt to either defy the ICC or undermine its credibility but should 
rather be seen as a product of negotiated engagement with the Court.211 Thus 
the AO from the ICJ would present an improved ICC that would be established 
on solid legal grounding.212  
From the discussions in the previous sections, there is the likelihood 
that the ICJ may agree with the ICC’s position on immunity of heads of states 
and other leaders of government. However, there are also views that there 
would be more clarity on the issue from the AO that would settle matters, 
which would also help the ICC work within a better framework that is more 
acceptable to all parties to the Statute than before.213  
Questions have since been asked as to what happens to cases that are 
still pending before the Court if, per chance, the African Union does not agree 
with the AO and decides to carry out its agenda of a mass withdrawal.214 
According to South African law professors Chenwi and Sucker, it could 
happen that some accused persons may escape ICC prosecution.215 However, 
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according to Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute, prosecution is still possible 
for cases that were ongoing at the time of withdrawal and also future cases 
that relate to alleged crimes committed while the state concerned was still a 
party to the Statute.216 Therefore, a withdrawal would definitely not affect the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC as the duty to cooperate with the Court 
would continue.217 Taking the case of Burundi, which finalized its withdrawal 
on October 27, 2017, the ICC confirmed that its investigation into “[a]lleged 
crimes against humanity committed in Burundi or by nationals of Burundi 
outside Burundi since 26 April 2015 until 26 October 2017 had not been 
affected and were currently ongoing despite the withdrawal becoming 
effective.”218 To add to this, there still lies the possibility of referrals of such 
cases from the UNSC by states not party to the Rome Statute, but who have 
United Nation membership, which would result in prosecutions subject to the 
principle of complementarity.219 
Therefore, current cases pending before the ICC, whether from party 
states or non-party states, would still continue despite what the outcome of the 
AO would be with a renewed strength to hold accountable all who are 
involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
3. Repairing the Damaged Relationship between the African Union and 
ICC 
All hope is not yet lost in this current deadlock between the African 
Union and the ICC. It has been suggested that if the ICC pays more attention 
to the issues raised by the African Union, it would lead to the restoration of 
the relationship that has been marred allegations of selective justice.220 This 
could be done through more constructive dialogue involving more of the ICC 
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supporting voices within the African Union221 and a focus on the need to take 
“African” concerns more seriously when assessing the ICC-AU relationship. 
Various attempts have been made in the past but have yielded no results.222 
Therefore, there should be a conscientious effort on the part of both 
institutions to ensure that outcomes of these meetings are enforced efficiently 
and effectively.223 
Also, both the African Union and the ICC should make an effort to shift 
grounds on the issue of criminal justice delivery. Thus, the two organizations 
must seek to revamp their approaches to international criminal justice and 
move from past contentious issues of interorganizational confrontation to 
peace and justice building of today and the future. The complementarity 
regime that the ICC was established upon must be implemented by both 
parties. This would involve the strengthening of national courts to effectively 
take jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.224 
This would ensure that the perpetrators of these crimes are held totally 
accountable thereby hopefully removing the root causes of conflict in 
Africa.225 
A future AO from the ICJ may have various implications whether it 
rules in the favor of the African Union or not. Whatever the outcome might 
be, it is the hope of many that both parties would take notice of various 
recommendations that would be made and work hand in hand to make the rule 
of law achievable on the African Continent and the world at large. 
4. Utilizing the ICJ Ruling to Foster a New AU-ICC Consensus 
The different perspectives on the issues stemming from this case 
demonstrate that “the importance of getting the immunity question right 
cannot be overstated,” since “[i]t implicates not just the first trial of a head of 
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state by the ICC, but the relationship between African states and the ICC more 
broadly.”226 
The outcome of the ICJ ruling should aim at fostering a new consensus 
for the African Union and the ICC. The African states and the African Union 
have expressed commitment to pursuing accountability for such crimes, as 
shown in earlier sections, their overwhelming support for the creation of the 
ICC, and currently holding the largest regional representation. Although the 
ICC is currently faced with a lot of challenges, it still remains a tool for justice 
and a solution in a continent where the quest for justice can be described as 
“searching for a needle in a hay stack.”227 Despite the numerous reservations 
that the African Union and African observers have expressed about the Court 
and its seeming lack of credibility, there are still many that have the view that 
future generations would support the ICC as a complementary global legal 
organization.228 This is because there would never come a time that the legal 
solutions to conflicts in Africa would be sufficient but surely “there can be no 
solution without justice.”229 The upcoming ICJ ruling should therefore bring 
both institutions to a renewed point where seeking and delivering justice 
should be the key focus at all times without political interference. As at the 
time of writing and for the interim, it is clear that the ICC would remain the 
only institution that has jurisdiction over the crimes that are committed with 
impunity in Africa. The cooperation of the African Union is therefore needed 
to ensure that the judgement of reason always outweighs that of power.230 This 
is further emphasized by Justice Robert H. Jackson’s statement at the 
commencement of the Nuremberg trials; 
“That four generations flushed with victory and stung with injury 
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive 
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enemies to the judgement of the law is one of the most significant 
tributes that Power has ever paid to reason….”231 
It is therefore the obligation of African states parties to the Rome 
Statute to cooperate with the ICC in a concerted effort at building a better 
institution that will deliver justice to states and victims that have been at the 
receiving end of violence perpetrated with impunity by some African leaders. 
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AN ICJ DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
A. Effects on the ICC Complementarity Jurisdiction 
The future of international criminal justice lies in the efficient and 
effective implementation of the complementarity principle by the national 
courts. Article 17 of the Rome Statue provides that substantive rules that make 
up the complementary regime and also qualifies the relationship between the 
ICC and national jurisdictions.232 The Statute grants states the authority to 
conduct their own trials with regards to the core crimes that are stipulated 
under the Statute with the aid of financial, technical, and professional support 
from the international community.233 
In light of a future ICJ decision, it is submitted that this principle of 
complementarity of ICC would be firmly established, that the ICC is only a 
complementary institution and should serve as such. If the African Union in 
the future moves on to establish the African Criminal Court with jurisdiction 
over international criminal acts or if the national courts become more 
empowered to settle these issues on their own, the ICC would face a lesser 
task of the Office of the Prosecutor having to go out “fishing” for targets and 
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cases as it has currently been accused of doing.234 These various regional 
groups, as well as states, would also have the capacity to try these crimes 
themselves and on their own territories which has been described as very 
crucial to enhancing the judicial process and beneficial to victims as well.235 
There may, therefore, come a time when the ICC would become an institution 
that deals with these crimes only when the State is unable to and not unwilling 
to try the crimes. Also, the ICC could serve as an institution that offers 
technical, professional and financial support for States that require these in the 
performance of their duties as well as further strengthening the legal systems 
of states party to the Rome Statute. In effect States’ sovereignty would be 
preserved while impunity is curbed to its minimum.236 
B. Effects on the Question of State Immunity and Immunity of State 
Officials 
A fundamental principle of the Rome Statute is that all defendants are 
equal before it.237 This provision of the Statute codifies the rule of customary 
international law, that whatever immunities an official might otherwise 
possess under international law cannot be implored as a restriction or a form 
of protection from criminal responsibility, ratione materiae.238 The Rome 
Statute, which also deals with “Irrelevance of Official Capacity,” provides 
that:  
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
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criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of 
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.239 
In recent times the meaning of this article has been under serious 
contention. Individuals who have been affected by this article have protested 
its application to their cases and have often applied Article 98 as their defense. 
Article 98 provides that:  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.240 
The application of Article 98 has led many parties’ signatories to the 
Rome Statute to declare their inability and unwillingness to give up or arrest 
individuals who may possess immunity under international law to the ICC 
without the agreement of their own nation state. The most recent is Jordan 
who refused to arrest Al-Bashir and defended itself by pleading “fundamental 
rules and principles of international law.”241 Also, in the past, the lawyers in 
the George W. Bush administration depended on Article 98 to negotiate 
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (“BIAs”) with other countries in order to 
avert any future surrender of any U.S. citizen to the Court.242 It has therefore 
been posited that the forthcoming AO from the ICJ would seek to clarify the 
relationship between Articles 27 and 98 in order to set to rest the issue of the 
immunity of state officials243 
However, there is extensive literature that supports the argument that 
states and state officials, should not be granted immunity for the most serious 
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crimes of an international nature.244 As stated earlier, the current controversy 
is viewed by many as an agenda that is more political than legal. From the 
history of the application of international criminal law, which dates back to 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals of 1945 until now, there is a clear 
principle of the removal of all manner of immunities from any person who 
commits the core crimes which are jus cogens before any international 
criminal court.245 This is proven from the work done by the International Law 
Commission and the establishment of ad hoc tribunals such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), as well as the Tokyo 
and Nuremberg tribunals.246 The late Professor Cherif Bassiouni (former 
consultant to the U.S. Departments of State and Justice) also supported this 
principle of removal of immunities from state officials when he stated in his 
book written after the Nuremberg Trials that “a new rule of customary 
international law was established, namely that international immunities do not 
apply to international prosecutions for certain international crimes.”247 It is 
therefore clear that the ICJ AO may not necessary stray from what has been 
developed in past and would give its ruling based on these guiding principles.  
The ICC must, at all costs, resist the political pressure that has been 
exerted upon it from various quarters. Instead, it should adhere to “what the 
law is”248 true to the standards of treaty interpretation under Article 21 of the 
Rome Statute as well as the Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties.249 
It is true that the text Article 98(1), when interpreted in conjunction with 
Article 27, causes some form of ambiguity. However, as Article 27 is seen as 
codifying a rule of customary international law, which seeks to deny 
individuals the opportunity to rely on immunities that are attached to their 
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positions as leaders in Government with regards to core crimes, the 
interpretation of Article 98 must take this into account.250  
The fact remains that people are not immune from prosecution before 
an international court for core crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute. Therefore, in the event that an individual who hails from a ICC 
state stands accused, they must obviously be rendered to the Court as a result 
of Article 27(2) and customary international law.251 For individuals that hail 
from states that are not party to the Rome Statute, it is the duty of the UNSC 
to temporally remove the immunity of such individuals and allow them to be 
prosecuted before an international court. This power of the UNSC is vested 
upon customary international law and was the foundation of the ICTY and the 
ICTR’s authority and from records, these ad hoc tribunals pursued high 
ranking leaders of governments, which included heads of states.252 Thus 
through its referral system, the UNSC is reinforcing customary international 
law as stipulated in Article 27 that official position is irrelevant to an 
individual being charged before an international court.253 The question of 
immunity of state officials may be described as the most important question 
facing international criminal law today. To this end, it is the hope of civil 
society groups and citizens of many countries that the forthcoming ruling of 
the ICJ will further enforce the ICC’s position, as well as that of the 
International Law Commission—that immunity does not apply to any state 
official who is accused of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.254 
C. Potential Uncertainties in the International Criminal Justice System 
There have, however, been certain views that the forthcoming AO 
would pose uncertainties in the international criminal justice system. Even 
 
 
250  See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir (July 14, 2018). 
251  Sadat, supra note 238, at 39. 
252  Both Slobodan Milosevic and Jean Kambanda were heads of government at the time of their 
indictment by the Security Council. 
253  Rome Statute art. 27, supra note 1, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 106. 
254  Adil Ahmad Haque, Immunity for International Crimes: Where Do States Really Stand?, JUST 
SECURITY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54998/immunity-international-crimes-states-stand.  
294 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 2 
 
 
though the African Union has raised various issues that are legally correct and 
call for further legal deliberation and clarification, the ICJ generally agrees 
with the African Union only on some issues—but it may eventually lean 
towards the position of the ICC in its final decision.255 According to the 
international legal expert, Professor Akande, such a move could create 
conflicts for future jurisprudence.256 In the light of this, questions have been 
asked as to what actions states should take in future situations where a 
cooperation request conflicts with the requested state’s obligation under 
customary or conventional international law to grant immunity. States 
sometimes use different interpretations of various treaties to fit their own 
purposes for opportunistic or diplomatic reasons.257 In the Arrest Warrant 
Case of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), the ICJ 
assessed immunity from prosecution for an acting minister of foreign affairs, 
finding that absolute immunity for heads of state from criminal prosecution in 
a domestic court exists under customary international law.258 However, such 
immunities may not bar criminal prosecution in all cases, such as before an 
international court with jurisdiction, including the ICC.259  
When a state has agreed to the obligations of an international treaty that 
waives immunity, such as the Rome Statute, this may fall within the exception 
pointed out by the ICJ. However, there is still room for confusion based on 
the treaty provisions.260 In relation to the ICC and its indictment of Al-Bashir, 
Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute. Some scholars argue that the UNSC 
resolution rendered Sudan akin to a State Party; hence, Sudan should be seen 
as bound by the Rome Statute.261 This line of reasoning is mainly based on the 
fact that UN member states, and therefore also Sudan, are required to carry 
out Chapter VII measures by virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter.262 This is 
further supported by the assertion that Article 103 of the UN Charter 
determines that, in the event of a conflict, obligations under the UN Charter 
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are paramount over all obligations “under any other international 
agreements.”263 However it can be argued that, while the UNSC has the power 
and right under the UN Charter to impose treaty obligations on nonstate 
parties when acting under Chapter VII,264 rendering Sudan a state party via 
the UNSC referral resolution and hence applying Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute to Sudan in ICC proceedings, could be problematic under international 
law. The general principle of international law of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt stipulates that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third State without its consent,” which is enshrined in Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.265 This position266 regarding 
Sudan as a non-state having to comply with state obligations arising from the 
Rome Statute after a Chapter VII UNSC referral has been decided in the 
negative by the ICC in Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan. There, the Court found 
that “the conclusion that Resolution 1593 altered Sudan’s legal position is 
inescapable—and . . . this is consistent with the basic structure of international 
law because Sudan consented to the UN Security Council exercising such a 
power.”267 
In the context of immunity and the prosecution of international crimes, 
and more specifically, in respect of national proceedings, the Al-Bashir case 
brings to the fore the question of hierarchy between sources of international 
law. More precisely, whether or not there is a hierarchy between international 
treaty provisions and customary international law rules, and if not, what are 
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the applicable conflict resolution principles?268 This constitutes a norm 
conflict in the strict sense since a state that is bound by these two rules “cannot 
simultaneously comply with its obligations.”269 
The current impasses between the African Union and the ICC have 
brought to the fore the various challenges with the interpretation of these 
treaties. This is however for the greater good because this enhanced dialogue 
would serve as support to the development of the jurisprudence of 
international criminal law. 
D. Potential “Supremacy” Battle Between the ICC and ICJ 
Another issue that has been raised by some legal scholars is that this 
move by the African Union would lead to a potential battle of supremacy 
between the ICC and the ICJ.270 This has been foreseen as happening should 
the ICJ make an attempt of circumventing the ICC’s jurisdiction on this matter 
by offering a deferring opinion.271 This could lead to a potential conflict in 
approaches between the two courts which is similar to the ICTY’s rejection in 
the Tadić case of the ICJ’s test for effective control as formulated in the 
Nicaragua case.272 
Also, the potential interaction between the ICJ and the ICC could turn 
out to be complex. This is true because, despite the fact that both courts are 
supranational in nature, they operate in different spheres when it comes to the 
areas of jurisdiction and subject matter.273 The ICJ is a court that adjudicates 
disputes between states. Meanwhile, the ICC is a penultimate criminal court 
that establishes foremost individual criminal responsibility and then (indirect) 
state liability arising from potential non-compliance with duties arising from 
the Statute.274 To date there has been little or no interactions between these 
two Courts and none were envisioned till now. To some scholars, the question 
 
 
268  Id. at 259. 
269  Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 426 (1953).  
270  Akande, ICC Issues, supra note 115  
271  Orina, supra note 33, ¶ 6.  
272  Id. 
273  Pillai, supra note 6. 
274  Id. 
APRIL 2020 AFRICAN UNION-ICC CONTROVERSY 297 
 
 
 
that would be put to the ICJ for clarification deals directly with legal issues 
that the ICC already adjudicates on. What remains for the international legal 
community to see is whether the ICJ would in effect function as an appellate 
court for the ICC and whether this would augur well for the international 
criminal justice system.275 Whether this would be feasible and what its future 
impact would be, will unfold as the case makes progress. 
E. International Criminal Justice in the aftermath of An ICJ Advisory 
Opinion 
The adoption of the Rome Statute marked an uneasy compromise in 
international law and practice.276 After two decades of prosecuting crimes of 
international nature, many have questioned the Court’s impact and whether 
international criminal justice has improved.277 It has been posited that the ICC 
is currently going through crisis, and the Court needs overhauling in order to 
regain its “glory” and credibility in the eyes of the international community 
as the apex criminal court dealing efficiently and effectively with various 
international crimes.278 The move taken by the African Union has therefore 
been described as a chance for the ICC to utilize the ICJ’s AO as an 
opportunity to review its format of operation in order to dispel allegations of 
bias and racism.279 
Also, many have regarded the upcoming opinion of the ICJ as a course 
of action that would serve to improve the development of international 
criminal justice. This is because the legal questions that form the current basis 
of the discord between the African Union and the ICC are multifaceted and 
advance significant issues related to justice and international accountability in 
general. It is without doubt that the clarification that this AO would bring to 
the issue of immunity of heads of states under the Rome Statute and customary 
international law would have wider implications on international law as well 
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as international institutions beyond the scope of the legal question which is 
currently under dispute.280 
For international criminal justice to develop from the level where it 
currently operates in light of such an ICJ decision, it would be prudent for all 
members of the United Nations to embrace the work of the ICC. The support 
for the ICC is currently low with the majority of world powers going to great 
lengths to disassociate themselves from the Court. This has further discredited 
the Court in several ways and hindered its progress as well. Efforts should be 
made to ensure that the ICC is well structured in its deliberations thereby 
making it relevant in the development of international criminal justice.  
V. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS  
The impasse that has developed between the African Union and the ICC 
over the past decade and its global effects continue to bring to the fore the 
challenges that the ICC encounters within the African legal context as well as 
the political and institutional landscape. The current political environment in 
Africa can be described as unfavorable to the development of law and justice 
on the continent. The complementarity principle of the ICC has failed to work 
on the African continent due to the opposition of some political leaders who 
are often, directly or indirectly, complicit in the commission of crimes under 
the Statute. The immunity principle proffered by the African Union has helped 
in shielding some of the masterminds of such crimes. The entrenched stance 
taken by both parties has not helped in resolving the matter and has in turn 
tarnished the image of the ICC. This could lead to its collapse if nothing is 
done and the African Union follows through with its plans of setting up its 
own criminal court and decides to withdraw from the ICC. It is therefore 
evident that certain measures need to be enforced to rebuild the confidence in 
the ICC as well as meet the expectations of peace and justice with special 
emphasis on Africa. The request for an AO from the ICJ was a step in the right 
direction, notwithstanding the outcome. In addition, the following measures, 
 
 
280  Pillai, supra note 6. 
APRIL 2020 AFRICAN UNION-ICC CONTROVERSY 299 
 
 
 
if implemented, could reasonably aid in ensuring that the international justice 
system is improved. 
A. Enhancing the capacity of member states to prosecute ICC crimes 
We recommend that the various institutions that deal with legal issues 
at the member state level in the African Union should be empowered to 
prosecute the crimes of the Rome Statute domestically, the standard in Europe 
and the United States. Such empowerment does require the availability of the 
necessary resources. The various actors—institutions, human resource etc.—
should be equipped with the necessary, infrastructure, skills development, and 
support to carry out the appropriate legal activities to ensure that such crimes 
are investigated and prosecuted efficiently and effectively. In addition to such 
resourcing, there is the need for a wider approach that promotes the role of the 
main institutional implementing and enforcing bodies. Such an approach calls 
for a total reform in the judicial services of many nation states. The judiciary 
should also be supported to be independent of the executive and the legislative 
arms of government. It is also recommended that the necessary legal training 
and retraining of judges, court officials, police, prison officers, and special 
prosecutors should be carried out frequently to empower them perform their 
duties of prosecuting such crimes as well as guarding the rights of citizens. 
The special prosecutors and judges must ensure that they are continuously 
abreast with the rules and regulations of the International Criminal Law and 
are putting them into practice in their work. Governments should also ensure 
that the necessary support in terms of resources are put in place for all offices 
of special prosecutors and attorney general departments to enable them to 
prosecute these crimes of international nature.  
B. Suspension of the Establishment of a Regional Criminal Court in 
Africa 
We also recommend that the African Union suspend its efforts to 
establish a regional criminal court or a criminal arm of the current African 
Court in the interim. In the objectives stated in its withdrawal strategy listed 
in the previous section, the establishment of an African criminal court is 
imbedded in sections (iii) and (iv) and the challenge of a possibility of 
selectivity, unfairness and double standards can definitely not be ruled out. 
This possibility is highlighted by the fact that the Amended Protocol provides 
immunity for heads of governments and their officials while they are in power 
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(which would be for very long periods because as it is familiar with Africa, 
there is a culture of leaders staying in power for very long periods). Under 
customary international law, personal immunity may only be raised before 
national courts of foreign states in relation to an indictment for international 
crimes. However, the African Union in the Amendment Protocol has extended 
this power to an international court which is contrary to established customary 
international law. As a result, several scholars have rightly viewed this 
provision as “a major setback in the advancement of international criminal 
justice,” which can only be construed as in tangent with the interests of those 
African leaders who are fearful of facing the law due to a culture of impunity 
they have created during their leadership.281 What the African Union has done 
speaks to the same challenge that it currently has with the UNSC, namely 
serving the interests of others to the detriment of ensuring justice.282 What the 
African Union should pursue is to empower its nation states to be able to 
prosecute such crimes in their own jurisdiction without unnecessary 
manipulation of the judicial systems. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The issue of immunity for heads of states and other government 
officials has been an ongoing tussle between the African Union and the ICC 
for over a decade. Over the years the two parties have remained entrenched in 
their positions with the African Union finally calling on its members not to 
cooperate with the ICC and threatening to withdraw from the ICC. This has 
resulted in a loss for both parties because the African Union has focused its 
attention over the years in fighting the ICC by resisting its efforts in Africa 
while abandoning its mission to ensure that victims of these crimes receive 
the necessary justice and perpetrators are not shielded from facing the law and 
that peace and the rule of law are upheld on the African continent. The ICC, 
on the other hand, has faced various challenges in performing its duties due to 
the lack of cooperation from the countries and also its inability to properly 
clarify the law during its deliberations. There has been bad blood between the 
two organizations for a long period and the African Union has finally decided 
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to request for an AO from the ICJ on this contentious issue which has been 
considered a right step towards the development of international criminal 
justice.  
Therefore, there is a general feeling that the ICJ, which is not bound by 
the Rome Statute and which is regarded as the foremost international tribunal 
on matters related to general international law, is the answer to making 
progress on this contentious issue.283 
This article has sought to discuss what led to this impasse between the 
two parties, it has also assessed the likely nature of the relationship that would 
exist between the two parties in light of the upcoming ruling and its 
implication on the future of international criminal justice. 
The central argument that permeates the article is that regardless of the 
outcome of an AO from the ICJ, the African Union and the ICC should forge 
a new consensus to build a better framework for the ICC to operate in. Adding 
to that, it is clear that the future of international criminal justice is imbedded 
in states becoming better equipped to adjudicate such crimes and to seek for 
help of the ICC when it becomes impossible to handle such matters. This 
would ensure that the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute is fully 
adhered to. Even though most African states currently lack the capacity to 
implement the provisions of the Rome Statute due to the “absence of effective 
legislative framework for implementation, limited expertise on the part of 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges, [and] the national judicial systems lack 
of resources as well as corruption[,] which has permeated all sectors of the 
economy,”284 it is the hope that moving forward regional bodies like the 
African Union will promote international criminal justice by allowing reason 
to prevail over politics, joining hands with the rest of the international 
community to ensure that the rule of law is maintained. A compromise must 
be sought and found. 
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